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1 Introduction
This paper presents a model of multi-product pricing for consumer security software. It highlights
two aspects unique to this kind of software. The first is a supply-side eﬀect relating to the security
software update process that alters its cost structure, and the second is a demand-side eﬀect relating
to the fact that customers often get free substitutes for components of security software suites, which
are bundled with products unrelated to computer security. We develop an analytical model that
captures each of these eﬀects. In contrast with prior results, this model predicts the optimality
of mixed bundling as a pricing strategy; we show how removing the eﬀects we highlight leads to
the optimality of pure bundling, which is consistent with past work on information goods. The
analytical model also predicts that the “discount" on a bundled software suite increases as the
variable cost of high-quality updates goes up. We test the predictions of our model using data on
security software demand and pricing we have gathered from Amazon.com, and find preliminary
support for our theory.
There are a number of aspects of security software that make its economics somewhat diﬀerent
from those of traditional consumer software. First, the quality of security software depends less
on the range of end-user features incorporated into the software, and more on the reliability and
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comprehensiveness of frequent updates from the seller of the software that are critical to its eﬀective
functioning. For example, Symantec’s AntiVirus software updates the virus definition files on each
of its clients using its LiveUpdate functionality very frequently (on the order of 100 updates a year;
far more than the frequency of product updates or upgrades for traditional application software).
The perceived quality of this software is likely to be aﬀected more by whether these virus definition
files are delivered in a timely manner, and whether they are collected comprehensively, rather
than by the interface or user features that AntiVirus oﬀers. Similarly, many spam blockers (such as
PanicWare’s MailWasher) include subscriptions to spam databases that frequently update the filters
on their clients; the functioning of these filters, most of which use some sort of binary classification
algorithm, depends critically on periodically retraining the filters to detect new forms of spam, or
updating them with newly trained ones.
The need to continuously maintain current lists of viruses (or of spamming techniques), to
develop functionality that responds to new threats, and to deliver these to each of one’s customers
imposes two kinds of costs on a seller. There is a fixed cost of maintaining the infrastructure
associated with the collection of new virus lists/spamming techniques, the application development
capability required to address each new threat, and the technological capability to deliver the
updates. There may be economies of scope across diﬀerent components of client security: the
capabilities required to deliver updates can be shared, and there may be learning from countering
one kind of security threat (antivirus software, for instance) that may reduce the cost of figuring
out how to maintain software that counters another (personal firewalls, for example). Additionally,
each new installation imposes a variable cost on the seller, since the seller has to keep track of and
periodically update one additional client’s computer1. It would seem sensible for a seller to take
this expected future stream of update costs into account when formulating their pricing strategy.
This is especially because it is likely to be independent of the number of components of a security
1This may not be a “continuously varying" cost, but may manifest as periodic discrete increases in labor, servers
and storage as one’s installed base increases.
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suite a client has installed, since the actual updates and fixes are developed independently, and the
primary cost driver is likely to be simply the need to keep track of one more client.
A second major distinguishing aspect of security software is that a number of consumers may not
wish to purchase certain components of a security software suite for reasons that are independent
of their preferences. This is because of the nature of security software: rather than being like
application software that provides consumers with software functionality, it is more like utility
software that “keeps their systems running" reliably. The reason why this distinction is important
is because the latter results in certain components of a security software suite being bundled with
other software that is not directly related to providing security. For instance, Windows XP is sold
bundled with a fairly eﬀective personal firewall. Most consumers do not purchase Windows XP
for security reasons; however, a consumer who has XP installed may not wish to pay for Norton’s
Firewall — this has little to do with the consumer’s underlying preferences for the capabilities of
the firewall. Similarly, a user of Google’s GMail is less likely to want to pay for a spam filter
because GMail’s spam filtering capability is quite advanced. Again, this unwillingness to pay is not
on account of the user’s preferences for spam (most users are likely to adopt GMail for its search,
interface and storage). Many organizations mandate the installation of antivirus software on all of
their employees computers, which leads to these employees being less willing to pay for independent
purchases of such software2. This aspect of security software manifests as a demand-side eﬀect,
wherein a random fraction of consumers have low (or no) willingness to pay for certain components,
independent of their preferences for the functionality provided by this component.
We model how each of these aspects — higher costs due to security updates that vary with the
number of client installations (rather than the number of components sold), and the presence of
2For instance, both authors of this paper have Symantec’s AntiVirus 8.0 installed on each of their computers,
and therefore have a willingness to pay of zero for antivirus software; this has nothing to do with their underlying
preferences for such software, and provides no information about their relative disutility from a potential computer
virus infection.
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a random fraction of customers whose willingness to pay for security components is independent
of their preferences — aﬀects optimal pricing strategy for security software. We show that mixed
bundling emerges as the optimal strategy, and relate the bundle discount to the magnitude of our
parameters. We then test the predictions of our model on data we have gathered from Amazon.com,
and find preliminary support for our theory.
We have organized the rest of this paper as follows. Section 2 presents our analytical model,
derives the optimal pricing strategy for security software suites, and outlines the empirical implica-
tions of our model. Section 3 describes our data and Section 4 presents the preliminary empirical
results. Section 5 concludes and summarizes our ongoing work.
2 Theory
We model a multi-product monopolist who sells two security software components (for example, an
antivirus program and a spam filter) for which consumer preferences and seller costs are symmetric.
The results of our model generalize to directionally for multiple components. Towards the end of
this section, we discuss the implications of our results for a model of multi-product oligopoly in
which each consumer has a preferred brand.
2.1 Model
A monopolist sells two security software components, denoted I and II. The seller makes two
choices: a quality level for its software, and a pricing strategy, The quality level s chosen is assumed
to be identical across both components, and the fixed cost borne by the seller from it choice is
denoted C(s). This includes development costs associated with the components, as well as fixed
costs associated with maintaining the infrastructure associated with updates at a quality level s.
The seller may price each component individually, may set a price for purchases of a bundle
of both components, or may oﬀer consumers both of these options. The price of each individual
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component3 is denoted pc, and the price of the bundle is denoted pb. The seller’s variable cost has
two parts. The first part is a base cost c0, which includes the costs of the CD, manual, packaging,
shrink-wrapping and distribution. If the software is distributed digitally, this cost may be zero.
The second part is a per-installation update cost cu that represents the expected future variable
costs that a seller will incur over the lifetime of the installation while keeping the installation of
its software current with the latest updates (of virus definition files, for instance, as discussed in
Section 1). We assume that the same cost [c0 + cu] is incurred when the seller sells either an
individual component or a bundle. That is, the marginal cost of adding the second component to
a bundle containing the first is zero. This is because the base cost is largely independent of how
many components are on the CD in the package, and the update cost is incurred on account of
having to contact an IP address, determine the status of updates, and send updated software/data
to the client: this is a per installation, rather than per component cost.
There is a unit mass of consumers. Each consumer is indexed by a parameter x which is
uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. If the quality level of the seller’s software is s, the
maximum utility that a consumer with index x gets from component I is s(1 − x), and from
component II is s[1− (1− x)]. Consumers preferences for the components are therefore based on
a model of these components being horizontally diﬀerentiated4.
A fraction r of consumers own a perfect substitute for component I, and an equal fraction r of
consumers own a perfect substitute for component II. As discussed in Section 1, this is on account
3Given the model’s symmetry, the assumption of symmetric component quality and price is without loss of
generality, and for expositional brevity, to avoid having to define multiple quality (and subsequently, price) variables
that will be equal in equilibrium. We can provide a more detailed exposition on request.
4A slightly more general formulation would include a “misfit cost" rater t which we have normalized to 1. Choosing
t > 1 leads to a positive mass of consumers (at the ends of the interval) placing no value on each component; these are
the customers with the highest valuation of the other component, which seems unrealistic. Choosing t < 1 increases
the value of the bundle relative to the value of each component for each consumer, but does not change our results
otherwise.
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of these components being developed and oﬀered by sellers of software that is directly unrelated
to security (firewalls with operating systems, spam filters with email clients). Since the ownership
of the unrelated software does not depend on a consumer’s preferences for security, the fraction is
chosen randomly, and independently for each component.
The realization of these random fractions segments consumers into four groups. The first
segment consists of consumers whose willingness to pay for each component is determined by their
index x, and this segment is of size (1− r)2. The second and third segments consist of consumers
whose willingness to pay for one of the two component is determined by their index x, and whose
willingness to pay for the other component is zero. Each of these segments is of size r(1− r). The
fourth segment consists of those consumers whose willingness to pay for both components is zero.
This split is illustrated in Figure 1. Notice that those customers who are willing to pay for both
components all have the same willingness to pay for the bundle — this is intentional, to enable our
model to capture “demand pooling" eﬀect of larger bundles in a two-component model.
The seller does not know which consumers are in each of these segments, and therefore, cannot
directly price-discriminate based on the consumer’s segment. The sequence of events is as follows:
the seller chooses their quality level s; the seller chooses their pricing strategy, and the relevant
values of pc and pB; consumers purchase either one component, both components or the bundle;
each party receives its payoﬀs.
2.2 Pure component pricing and pure bundling
We first present some baseline results about pure component pricing, and pure bundling. Next,
we characterize the optimal prices under mixed bundling, show that mixed bundling is optimal if
and only if r > 0, and examine how the seller’s bundling strategy aﬀects their choice of quality
of upgrades. We then examine how the discount oﬀered by the seller on its security suite varies
with the variable cost of security updates cu and the fraction of customers with outside substitutes
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Segment 1: Willing to pay for both components Segment 2: Willing to pay for component I
Segment 3: Willing to pay for component II Segment 4: Not willing to pay for either
Figure 1: Illustrates consumer willingness to pay for each component as a function of their index
x, in each of four segments. In each figure, the blue (thick) line denotes WTP for component I,
the maroon (thin) line denotes WTP for component II , and the black (dotted) line denotes WTP
for a bundle of both components.
r. Finally, we discuss extensions that admit asymmetry in the demand for the individual security
components, and what the model’s results tell us about oligopoly.
Our first result characterizes optimal pure component pricing, when the seller does not oﬀer a
bundle of the two components.
Lemma 1 The seller’s optimal choice of pure component pricing is
pc =
s+ [co + cu]
2
. (1)
All our proofs are in Appendix A. The result of this lemma is straightforward: in the absence of
a bundle, the demand for each component is independent, and therefore, the seller simply chooses
the profit-maximizing monopoly price for each component.
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Our next result characterizes optimal pricing under pure bundling, when the seller only prices
its bundle, and does not sell either component independently.
Lemma 2 The seller’s optimal choice of pure bundle pricing is as follows: if r ≤ s
3s− 2[c0 + cu]
,
then pB = s, and if r >
s
3s− 2[c0 + cu]
, then pB =
µ
s+ [c0 + cu]
2
+
s(1− r)
4r
¶
.
Lemma 2 shows that for a range of lower values of r, the seller prices the bundle at the maximum
possible price s. At this price, only to those customers who are willing to pay for both products
(segment 1 in Figure 1) purchase the bundle. For higher values of r, there is a suﬃciently high
number of customers in segments 2 and 3 to warrant lowering pB below the maximum, in order to
induce a fraction of these customers to purchase. Also, as c increases, the range of values of r over
which the seller sets the maximum possible price increases, which is natural, since it is more costly
to increase revenues by lowering price.
It is straightforward to show that pure bundling always dominates pure component pricing. A
proof of this assertion is available on request; since it is not central to our research questions, it is
not discussed further.
2.3 Optimal mixed bundling
Our next result specifies the seller’s optimal choice of mixed bundling, and is described in Propo-
sition 1.
Proposition 1 The seller’s optimal choice of pricing when using a mixed bundling pricing strategy
is as follows:
(a) For r ≤ s
2(s− [c0 + cu])
, the seller chooses the maximum bundle price:
pB = s (2)
pc =
s+ [c0 + cu]
2
+
(1− r)(s− [c0 + cu])
2
(3)
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(b) For r >
s
2(s− [c0 + cu])
, the seller lowers the bundle price below the maximum, but still
prices each component lower than the bundle:
pB =
s+ [c0 + cu]
2
+
s
4r
(4)
pc =
s+ [c0 + cu]
2
+
s(1− r)
4r
(5)
Proposition 1 shows that for all values of r < 1, the component prices (as well as the bundle
price) are higher than the pure components (monopoly) price derived in Lemma 1. In addition, the
range of values of r over which the seller charges the maximum bundle price is larger under mixed
bundling than under pure bundling. The intuition for this is as follows: when using mixed bundling,
and with pB = s, a fraction of customers in segment 1 already choose to purchase the components,
since their surplus is positive form doing so. This is in contrast with their choices under pure
bundling, where every customer in segment 1 bought the bundle. Moreover, the corresponding sets
of customers in segments 2 and 3 also purchase the components, so the seller’s lost revenue from
these segments when pB = s is lower.
When r = 0, pB = pc = s, and the seller’s strategy becomes equivalent to pure bundling,
since the demand for the individual components is zero at these prices. All customers purchase the
bundle, and the seller captures all their surplus. This is consistent with prior results on monopoly
bundling (Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999) — note that while our model includes a positive variable
cost [c0 + cu], the marginal cost of adding a component to the bundle is zero.
Our next proposition specifies the seller’s optimal pricing strategy.
Proposition 2 When r > 0, mixed bundling is the seller’s optimal pricing strategy, for any c0 ≥
0, cu ≥ 0.
The proposition’s proof is straightforward: it follows from the fact that pc < pB when r > 0,
and therefore, mixed bundling yields higher profits than any pure bundling strategy (notice that a
pure bundling strategy with price p yields profits that are identical to those under pc = p, pB = p).
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This is an important conclusion, because it indicates that the kind of random participation that is
unrelated to a customer’s preferences, which we have modelled as being characteristic of consumer
security software, leads to a diﬀerent optimal pricing strategy.
Define the seller’s discount on their bundle as the percentage diﬀerence between the price of the
bundle and the sum of the prices of the individual components: that is, [1−(pB/2pc)]. By inspection
of equations (2-5), it is clear that the seller always discounts their bundle, since pc > (s+[c0+cu])/2,
while pB ≤ s. The following corollary describes how this discount varies with c and r.
Corollary 1 The discount oﬀered by the seller on their bundled security suite is strictly increasing
in the variable update cost cu, and strictly decreasing in the fraction r of customers who have an
outside substitute for a security component.
The next corollary describes how the relative demand for the bundle and its individual compo-
nents vary with cu and r.
Corollary 2 The demand for the bundle relative to the demand for the component increases in the
update cost cu, and decreases in r.
Intuitively, as c increases, selling the bundle becomes increasingly desirable for the seller, since
profit margins on both products shrink as c increases, but at a higher (percentage) rate for the
component. A natural response for the seller is to adjust prices that shift demand away from
the bundle and towards the components. Correspondingly, as r increases, the size of the segment
containing potential customers for the bundle shrinks, leading to a pricing response that shifts
demand in the opposite direction.
2.4 Implications for oligopoly pricing
We have analyzed an extension of the monopoly model to the case of duopoly with brand prefer-
ences. That is, we model duopoly pricing for two firms M and N . who sell identical product lines.
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A fraction k of customers have a preference for brand M , and a fraction (1− k) have a preference
for brand N . The firms first choose quality levels sM , sN , and then choose pricing strategy (which
may include pure component pricing, pure bundling, or mixed bundling). Our analysis of this
model is in progress, and our current results indicate that while prices for both firms are lower than
monopoly prices, each chooses a mixed bundling strategy (which is symmetric when k = 0.5), and
the monopoly results of Proposition 2, and of Corollaries 1 and 2 persist, so long as the preferences
for brands are not too weak.
2.5 Empirical implications
Our analytical model and its assumptions leads to the following hypotheses about consumer security
software:
1. If r > 0, the optimal pricing strategy involves mixed bundling (Proposition 2).
2. If the cost of updates cu is greater then zero, then the variable cost of security software is
higher than the variable cost of standard application software.
3. The higher the cost of updates cu,
(a) the greater the discount oﬀered on bundled suites of security software (Corollary 1).
(b) the higher the demand for the bundle relative to the demand for the components (Corol-
lary 2).
4. Between two security software product categories X and Y with the same update costs, and
with corresponding fractions rX and rY , if rX > rY , then
(a) the discount oﬀered on a bundle of X and Y is higher relative to the component price
of Y than to the component price of X (Corollary 1).
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(b) the demand for a bundle of X and Y is higher relative to the demand for Y than to the
demand for X (Corollary 2).
In order to test these hypotheses, we first need estimates of the variable costs for diﬀerent
security software, as well as estimates of the variable costs for standard application software. These
can be inferred from the markups
µ
p− c
p
¶
for each product (component, bundle), which in turn
are computed using the Lerner index for each product, which uses the price elasticities of demand
for these products with respect to their own prices, with respect to the prices of their substitutes
(the bundle for each component, and each component for the bundle), and with respect to the prices
of competing products. We follow the approach of Hausman (1994), who provides the following
to estimate the markups for products sold by multi-product oligopolists, weighted by their market
share. For simplicity, we make the following assumption: that the demand for the components
of the bundle of each firm are independent (that is, for instance, there is no substitution between
spam software and anti-virus software, except through the sales of a bundle that contains both
components). Therefore, the estimated markups for components involve own-price elasticities,
cross price elasticities with respect to the bundle sold by the firm, and the cross-price elasticities
of the corresponding component and bundle of any competing firm(s).
Based on this assumption, the revenue-share-weighted markups can be computed as follows.
Consider a set of products {0, 1, 2, ...,m}, where the bundle is indexed by 0 and the other products
are its components. Assuming, as in our model, that all substitution between individual components
is mediated by the bundle (that is, demand for the components are mutually independent). Then,
the first-order conditions for oligopoly profit maximization yield the following:
s0 +
mX
i=1
·
pi − ci
pi
si
¸
ηi0 = 0 (6)
sj +
·
p0 − c0
p0
s0
¸
η0j = 0, j = 1, 2, ...,m (7)
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Here, si is the demand share of i and ηij are cross price elasticities. We therefore have a system
of linear equations such that
s+N 0M = 0 (8)
where s is the vector of revenue shares, N is the matrix of cross price elasticities and M is the
vector of price cost markups multiplied by the product share under the Nash-Bertrand assumption.
By inverting the matrix of own and cross price elasticities, we estimate the marginal costs, ci of
each individual component of a bundle.
3 Data and Evidence
3.1 Industry Details
The 2 largest firms in the security software industry are Symantec and McAfee, whose combined
revenues account for over half the total industry revenues.5 The various products in the security
industry can categorized into the following classes.6
(i) Secure Content Management: SCM is a market that reflects corporate customers’ need
for policy-based Internet management tools that manage Web content, messaging security, virus
protection, and malicious code. SCM is a super-set of three specific product areas: Antivirus
software, Web filtering and Messaging security software.
(2) Firewall/VPN Software: The firewall/VPN market consists of software that identifies and
blocks access to certain applications and data. These products may also include virtual private net-
work (VPN) encryption as an option. Software firewalls fall into two distinct categories: enterprise
and desktop. The desktop firewall is itself divided into corporate and consumer categories.
(3) Intrusion Detection and Prevention Software: Intrusion detection products provide contin-
5There are also a few other known firms as well such as Trend Micro, Computer Associates and Internet Security
Systems.
6See IDC 2004, “Worldwide Security Software 2004-2008 Forecast”.
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uous monitoring of devices or networks and react to malicious activity. Intrusion prevention is a
subset of intrusion detection because you must be able to detect before you can prevent.
(4) Security and Vulnerability Management Software: (SVM) is a comprehensive set of solutions
that collects and correlates events, adds security intelligence to the mix, provides proactive alerts,
and suggests fixes. They also automate or semi-automate the process of discovering systems on the
network, identifying missing patches and installing those patches across the enterprise immediately
or on a scheduled basis.
3.2 Data
To estimate the model of demand, we compiled a market-level data set on a cross-section of security
software vendors, encompassing the above four categories. Our data are compiled from publicly
available information on new product prices and sales rankings at Amazon.com. The data are
gathered using automated Java scripts to access and parse HTML pages downloaded from the
retailer. The data was collected over a 120 day time period from October 2004 to February 2005
and includes 45 individual software titles from the Security Products category. These products
include a mix of bundled security suites as well as their individual components. A representative
list of our products is given in the Appendix in Table 4. For each sample, we collect data on the
Amazon.com sales rank (which serves as a proxy for quantity sold as described in Section 3.3),
list prices, new good prices charged by Amazon.com, the date the product was released into the
market, the average customer rating for the product and number of reviewers based on which the
average rating was displayed. We also collected similar data from Amazon’s marketplace. Note
that Amazon allows even some of its competitors like Oﬃce Depot and J&R to sell products on its
marketplace. Thus our data also takes into account some of the competitive eﬀects on the retail
prices. The summary statistics of our data are given in Tables 2 and 3. 7
7We also have data from Buy.com consisting of sales ranks, list prices and retail prices and so on for the various
products in our sample. Buy.com provides sale rankings of all of its products publicly and these sales ranks are also
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3.3 Demand share, revenue share and elasticity estimates
Two recent papers provided a way to map the observable Amazon.com sales rank to the corre-
sponding number of books sold. In both cases, the authors find on a stable relationship between
the ordinal sales rank of a book and the cardinal number of sales, using roughly the following Pareto
relationship:
Log(Qi) = K − βLog(Ri), (9)
where Qi is the demand for product i and Ri is its sales rank. Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003) cali-
brate this relationship using a creative and easily executed experiment where the authors obtain a
book with a known number of weekly sales, purchase several copies of the book in rapid succession
from Amazon.com and track the Amazon sales rank before and shortly after their purchase. Using
these two points, they estimate =-0.855. Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith (2003) calibrate this rela-
tionship using data from a book publisher mapping the Amazon sales rank to the number of copies
the publisher sold to Amazon. The data include weekly sales and rank observations for 321 books
with sales ranks ranging from 238 to 961,367 observed over the course of weeks in the summer of
2001. Using these data they estimate β = −0.871. Over the next two weeks, we will conduct a
similar sales-rank experiment for software titles. For this preliminary analysis, we use the value of
β = −0.871 that was estimated by Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith (2003). Notice that since our em-
pirical analysis aims to compare assessed variable costs across security and non-security software,
so the absolute values of these parameters β are unlikely to change our results directionally.
Once we make this assumption about β, we can calculate pair-wise demand and revenue shares
without any knowledge of K in the following way (illustrated for one component and one bundle).
Let Qi be the demand for one product in question (for instance, a bundle), and Qj be the demand
for another (for instance, one of its components). Let their corresponding prices be pi and pj, and
based on actual quantities sold at their site, similar to Amazon.com. The Buy.com data exhibits similar summary
characteristics as the Amazon. com data.
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their corresponding sales ranks be Ri and Rj . Define the demand ratio of product i with respect
to product j as:
δij =
Qi
Qj
, (10)
and the revenue ratio of product i with respect to product j as:
ρij =
piQi
pjQj
. (11)
It follows from (9) that (10) can be rewritten as:
log(δij) = β[log(Rj)− log(Ri)], (12)
and therefore:
δij =
µ
Rj
Ri
¶β
. (13)
Similarly,
ρij =
pi
pj
µ
Rj
Ri
¶β
, (14)
and therefore, for any product pair, δij and ρij can be inferred directly from our Amazon.com data.
Now, the demand share of product j as a fraction of the total demand for product i and product
j is simply Qi/[Qi +Qj], which rearranges to:
Qj
Qi +Qj
=
1
1 + δij
, (15)
and similarly, the revenue share of product j as a fraction of the total revenue from product i and
product j can be written as:
pjQj
piQi + pjQj
=
1
1 + ρij
. (16)
This extends to multiple products, so long as the pairwise demand and revenue ratios are computed.
For example, the demand share of product j as a fraction of the total demand for a set of products
is simply:
QjP
i∈A
Qi
=
Ã
1 +
P
i∈A,i6=j
δij
!−1
. (17)
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Additionally, diﬀerentiating both sides of (9) with respect to pj and multiplying throughout by pi
yields:
pi
Qi
dQi
dpj
= −β pi
Ri
dRi
dpj
, (18)
which in turn implies that we can directly estimate price elasticities from sales ranks without
computing demand levels, so long as we have estimates of dRidpj . We estimate these using log-linear
regressions of observations over time, and controlling for Amazon marketplace prices, the time since
the product was released (Datediﬀ), the customer rating (Customer Rating) and the number of
reviewers (Number of Reviewers) who have reviewed the product.
4 Preliminary results
We test our first hypothesis using three software suites produced by Norton (Symantec), McAfee and
Adobe Systems: Norton Anti Virus and Personal Firewall 2004, McAfee Virus Scan and Firewall
2005 and Adobe Photoshop 3.0 and Premier Elements. First, we confirm trivially by observation
that each component of the suite is also sold individually, and therefore, the firms are using mixed
bundling. In order to estimate the optimality of mixed bundling, we assess the extent to which each
firm’s profits would increase by dropping (a) its bundle (that is, oﬀering pure component pricing),
and (b) sales of its individual components (that is, oﬀering just a pure bundle).
A multi-product firm faces two consequences of extending its product line: a “cannibalization
eﬀect" and a “revenue generating eﬀect".8 The former eﬀect captures the encroachment of addi-
tional products introduced by the firm on the market share of the firm’s existing products. The
8Several empirical studies (Kekre and Srinivasan 1990, Bayus and Putsis 1999) have demonstrated that product
proliferation and in particular line extensions can be a profitable strategy for managers. Firms compete through their
product lines in two ways. First, firms have an incentive to extend their product lines along a vertically diﬀerentiated
dimension, in order to extract more consumer surplus. This involves quality based price discrimination. Another
kind of line extension is on the horizontal dimension. This is dictated by competitive considerations, particularly to
prevent poaching by rival firms.
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latter eﬀect captures the fact that introducing a new product expands the firm’s entire market:
either by bringing in new customers who were unserved by existing product lines (the “market
expansion" eﬀect) or by poaching its competitors’ customers (the “business stealing" eﬀect). The
interplay between these eﬀects eventually determines the optimality of extending one’s product
line. In our context, a bundle of two or more components can lead to the same eﬀects. It can
potentially cannibalize the market share of the individual components but, at the same time, it can
also expand the firm’s total market share and revenues. Our first hypothesis thus aims to test the
optimality of mixed bundling for security software products using the same ideas.
To estimate the impact of bundles on individual components and vice-versa, we note that from
the definition of elasticity, due to competition from individual components, the change in bundled
suite sales, ∆Qbi should be given by:
∆Qbi = Qbiηbici
Pbi − Pci
Pbi
, (19)
where Qbi is the total number of bundled suites of product i sold per year, ηbci is the cross
price elasticity of the bundle with respect to prices of the components c1, c2, .., ci, and the fourth
term corresponds to the average discount of component prices with respect to the price of the
bundled suite. Using our cross price elasticity estimates of a bundle with respect to a component
product, we compute the number of bundle sales lost due to the concurrent availability of individual
components. Similarly, using the elasticity estimates of a component with respect to the bundle,
we compute the number of component sales lost, ∆Qci due to the presence of a bundle.
∆Qci = Qciηcibi
Pci −
PbiPi
k=1
Pbi
. (20)
We are thus able to derive the “cannibalization eﬀect" and a “revenue generating eﬀect of each
product, both bundles and individual components. While this does not take into account price
changes that the firm would implement if it were to change its product line, a negative result would
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indicate that mixed bundling is not optimal (and therefore, while not suﬃcient to establish the
optimality of mixed bundling empirically, it seems necessary).
We conduct this analysis for each of our 3 product lines: Adobe, Norton and McAfee. For the
Adobe family, our analysis reveals that 19.73% and 13.5% of bundle revenues were cannibalized
by the individual components Adobe Premier and Adobe Photoshop, respectively. Similarly, the
bundled suite cannibalized 19.5% and 3% of Adobe Premier and Adobe Photoshop revenues, re-
spectively. In the same time period, the ratio of the total revenues of Adobe Premier and Adobe
Photoshop to that of the bundle, was approximately 34.3. Thus, given the information on prices
that we have from the data, our analysis revealed that the gain in revenues from a larger market
share (across all three products), more than compensated for the loss due to cannibalization, both
due to the bundle as well as the individual components. For the McAfee family, our estimates
highlight that 8.1% and 1.5 % of the bundle revenues were cannibalized by two the individual
components McAfee VirusScan and McAfee Firewall, respectively. Similarly, the bundled suite
cannibalized 9% and 2% of Adobe Premier and Adobe Photoshop revenues, respectively. In the
same time period, the ratio of the total revenues of McAfee VirusScan and McAfee Firewall to
that of the bundle, was approximately 15.1. Again, given the information on prices that we have
from the data, our analysis revealed that the gain in revenues from a larger market share (across
all three products), more than compensated for the loss due to cannibalization, both due to the
bundle as well as the individual components of the bundle. We obtain similar trends for Norton
products. This analysis provides preliminary support for our hypothesis that mixed bundling is
indeed optimal for both firms and thus confirms Hypothesis 19
Next, based on (10-17), we compute demand and revenue shares for each of our products, which
are then used in (6) as appropriate to compute the markups and the marginal costs of each of our
products. These are summarized in Table 3. Our empirical analysis confirms that the marginal
costs on average for security software are higher than those of non-security software, which provides
9Details of all analysis have been avoided for brevity and are available with the authors upon request.
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preliminary support for Hypothesis 2.
We also compare bundle discounts for those security products with higher variable cost, and
find preliminary support for Hypothesis 3. The estimated relative demand δij, however oﬀers mixed
evidence. The McAfee bundle has a higher proportionate demand than the Adobe bundle and this
is consistent with the fact that the McAfee family of products has higher marginal costs on an
average than the Adobe family of products. However, the Norton bundle seems to have the lowest
proportionate demand across all three products.
Name Category MC Markup % Discount Demand Ratio
Norton AntiVirus and Firewall Bundle 23.61 0.70 0.33 0.4
Norton Antivirus Component 22.02 0.69
Norton Personal Firewall Component 22.69 0.55
McAfee Virus Scan and Firewall Bundle 22.91 0.60 0.32 0.53
McAfee VirusScan Component 20.12 0.55
McAfee Firewall Component 21.36 0.39
Adobe Premier and Photoshop Bundle 17.84 0.83 0.3 0.52
Adobe Premier Component 17.19 0.80
Adobe Photoshop Component 16.64 0.74
Table 1: Markups of Sample Products where Markup = (P-MC)/P
5 Concluding Remarks
We have presented a theoretical model which relates a security firm’s pricing strategy to two
important aspects that distinguish security software, and have shown how these aspects aﬀect
optimal bundle and component pricing. We have provided preliminary empirical validation of some
of our analytical results using a unique data set from Amazon.com. Our theoretical analysis in
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progress will complete the mathematical analysis of our model of oligopoly. We also aim to assess
the impact of pricing strategy on the optimal levels of product quality chosen by the seller, and
explore an extension to components with asymmetric value. To complete our empirical analysis,
we will first conduct experiments to estimate β for software on Amazon.com. We will then expand
the scope of our tests of Hypotheses 1 through 3 to include a larger data set, one we have already
complied. We plan to have all this completed by the time WEIS 2005 is held.
Towards testing Hypothesis 4, we are currently determining a robust way of inferring or ranking
r for diﬀerent components in our sample. For instance, for the Norton and McAfee security bundle
suites, we may be able to infer this parameter from the current installed base of all firewalls and all
antivirus software. One way of getting this data is using an external oﬄine source such as that from
NPDTechWorld. NPD provides weekly and monthly national reports on software sales trends based
on actual point-of-sale (POS) data. Their software track provides competitive product information
down to the title level.10
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22
6.1 Data Summary
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sales Rank 969.11 97.26 1 5692
List Price 54.16 126.17 1.95 1499.99
Amazon Price 45.53 8.57 1.95 1199.99
Non-Amazon Price 47.74 3.08 1.01 1199.99
Customer Rating 3.14 0.99 1 5
Number of Reviewers 25.72 16.3 1 66
Datediﬀ 717.7 1336.22 0 1750
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Components in Dataset
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sales Rank 1649.61 971.26 1 4622
List Price 99.16 226.17 1.95 1799.99
Amazon Price 95.53 208.57 1.95 1699.99
Non-Amazon Price 87.74 203.08 1.01 1209.99
Customer Rating 3.4 0.9 1 5
Number of Reviewers 15.72 6.3 1 60
Datediﬀ 707.7 1316.22 0 1750
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Bundled products in Dataset
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Products Name Category
1 McAfee VirusScan 2004 Component
2 Norton Antivirus Software 2004 Component
3 Norton Internet Security 2004 Bundle
4 Norton SystemWorks 2004 Bundle
5 Norton Ghost 9.0 Component
6 Norton AntiSpam 2004 Component
7 Norton Personal Firewall 2004 Component
8 PC-cillin Internet Security 2005 Component
9 Home Trend Micro PC-cillin Internet Security 2005 Component
10 ZoneAlarm Security Suite 2005 Bundle
9 ZoneAlarm with Antivirus Component
10 ZoneAlarm Pro 5.5 Component
11 Symantec AntiVirus Small Business 9.0 Component
12 McAfee VirusScan 2005 Component
15 McAfee Internet Security 2005 7.0 Bundle
16 McAfee SpamKiller 5.0 Component
Table 4: A Selective Sample of Products
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